Restorative justice: is anything new under the sun?
by The Right Hon Lady Justice Rafferty, DBE
Chancellor of the University of Sheffield
The 10th Edward Bramley Sheffield Law Lecture delivered on 26 October 2017
Published by Coventry Lord Mayor’s Committee for Peace & Reconciliation
On behalf of Coventry Restorative Justice Forum
Copyright 2017 © Anne Rafferty
It is a real pleasure to have been asked to give this year’s Edward Bramley lecture, and to follow such distinguished lecturers as Lord Slynn, who gave it in 1995. For over 50 years Edward Bramley inspired young lawyers. He helped train them before there was a law school, a University, or a Law Society in Sheffield. He was head of department, then Dean, and ultimately, from 1946-1951 Pro-Vice Chancellor. His career spanned more than fifty years, during which he must have seen significant attempts to change the way justice was done. Let me give you two examples.
First, the approach taken by the criminal justice system and, in particular, its approach to probation; where reform remains an issue. When Edward Bramley began his career placing those convicted on probation was done informally by Magistrates’ Courts. There was no probation service. There were, however, what were known as ‘police court missionaries’, volunteers from religious bodies who supervised individuals convicted of offences before the Magistrates’ Courts. In 1907, and having recognised its value, Parliament gave this informal system statutory force through the Probation of Offenders Act. This required Magistrates’ Courts to appoint probation officers. It is one thing however to place a law on the statute book. It is another matter entirely to give it life. By 1922 a significant number of Magistrates’ Courts had not implemented the 1907 Act’s provisions. It took a further Act, the 1925 Criminal Justice Act, to ensure – constrain, perhaps – complete implementation. Even then many Magistrates’ courts only appointed probation officers because they had to, not because they understood the value of probation or the work probation officers did. By the end of his career, Bramley would have known probation to be an integral part of the criminal justice system. It still is, now run by Her Majesty’s Prisons and Probation Service. Change came. But it took time, effort, persuasion – and ultimately firmness. Second, the civil justice system and its approach to managing litigation. Historically, parties– claimants and defendants – were responsible for managing the process. The role of judges was mainly to ensure procedural rules were followed, determine applications by the parties, and adjudicate at trial. Active parties. Passive judges. That was, generally speaking, the approach.
This division of labour was not without its problems. It was one factor which led to litigation being too expensive and too lengthy, and probably too expensive because it was too lengthy. The remedy? A greater role for judges in managing the pace of litigation. This was first suggested in 1826. I’d like to tell you that we’ve never looked back but I’m afraid we hadn’t even looked forward – it was not taken up. It was then suggested in the 1870s, and an attempt made to introduce it through what was known as the Summons for Directions. We judges were into the swing of things by then. We made sure that did not work too well either. An attempt to refurbish it was made in the 1950s. It was a dead letter. It was finally, and effectively, introduced in 1999 as part of the Woolf reforms to civil procedure. I say effectively, it’s still a work-in-progress, but we’re getting there. As with probation, change came. And rather rapidly – we had it up running and working within 170 years!
There are, of course, many other examples of significant change, both over the course of the last century and previous centuries. We tend to think the way we do things is the way they have always been done, but that is rarely, if ever, the case. Our civil court structure is only a little over a hundred years old. Our criminal court structure is a product of reforms in the 1970s. The structure of our legal profession is a result of 19th century reform. The adversarial criminal trial is a product of the 18th and then 19th centuries. A defendant can give evidence !! Goodness, how ground-breaking. And even the idea that our civil trials have always been adversarial fails to take account of the investigative role adopted for 12 much of its history by the Court of Chancery.
Change is an inevitable and necessary feature of our justice system. What my two examples show, however, is that change – reform – tends to require a significant time before it settles in as effective. Very often the first attempt ends in failure. On occasion, as we have seen, so do the second and sometimes the third. This is particularly so where change involves what scientists and philosophers refer to as a ‘paradigm shift’. That idea was developed in the 1960s by Thomas Kuhn, in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The classic example is one any primary school child could tell us – even if “paradigm” might stump them – the shift from the view that the Sun and stars revolve round the Earth, to the view that the Earth orbits the Sun. Not just scientists and philosophers though. Lawyers have been known on occasion to use the term. Lord Falconer, when Lord Chancellor, described the Woolf reforms, judges managing litigation, as bringing about a ‘paradigm shift’ in civil justice. 
My lecture today is about such a potential shift, or shift-in-waiting, in our approach to criminal justice, one which the late 19th and early 20th century reforms to probation foreshadowed: the development of restorative justice. This is, of course, an area in which the University of Sheffield has played a crucial role, in the work of Joanna Shapland, Edward Bramley Professor of Criminal Justice, Dr Gwen Robinson and Dr Angela Sorsby. Edward Bramley would have been proud to see what was very much his Law Faculty leading the way. I am. I want to focus on three things:
- First, the nature of restorative justice;
- Second, some past attempts to introduce it; and
- Finally, future possibilities.
To begin at the beginning, we need to know what it is we’re talking about. What is restorative justice? The question might seem straightforward. The answer is not. Restorative justice has been described as a concept which means ‘all things to all people’, as a ‘slogan of a global social movement’. More prosaically, it has been described as ‘a process whereby all parties with a stake in a particular [criminal] offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future.’ Different people, from its conception by Albert Eglash in 1977 have taken different views on its scope and meaning. Different answers or conceptions of restorative justice there may be, but we can tease out elements common to each.
First, each understands that the relationship between victim and offender is central. Each contemplates a victim and offender meeting, or at least communicating, to determine a satisfactory resolution. Such encounters can be face-to-face or mediated through a third party. 
Compare and contrast the traditional approach which sees the primary relationship as that between State and offender. As Zehr puts it, rather than crime constituting ‘a violation of the state’, restorative justice defines it as a ‘violation of one person by another’. That definition goes much further than the approach in England and Wales, where victims of crime can before sentence submit to the court a Victim Personal Statement. The opportunity aims to give victims ‘a voice in the criminal justice process’ through enabling to ‘explain in [their] own words how a crime has affected them, whether physically, emotionally, financially or in any other way.’ This development is generally seen as an important step, but it does not position a victim at the centre of the criminal process. It might be thought to have put his or her status – I am sure that is the wrong word, I’m not sure what the right one is – into the spotlight, or at least in some way to have illumined it. However, restorative justice in England, under the Victim’s Charter, provides a mechanism to bring victim and offender together. That is at least capable of genuflection to this common aspect of restorative effort by moving the victim to the heart of the criminal justice process, albeit it in what might be viewed as an exception to the norm. 
Second, restorative justice can also be taken to refer to a requirement that the offender make good the harm s/he caused the victim. That idea is, in fact central to the approach of the Ministry of Justice. It understands restorative justice to be a ‘process that brings together those harmed by crime, and those responsible for the harm, into communication, enabling everyone involved by a particular incident to play a part in repairing the harm and finding a positive way forward.’ Reparation is inherent to that working definition. There are different views on what it might entail. It could, for instance, mean no more than that victim and offender agree the activities the latter should undertake to repair the harm. Criminal damage to property might result in agreed compensation payments, or in reparative work – probably physical – undertaken. It can also cater for victim and offender, with a facilitator, to explain their feelings, the effect of the offence, its motivation, and the appropriate way in which to respond to it. As the Victim’s Code puts it, it can thus facilitate ‘closure’ for the victim, although that is perhaps an inapt choice of language and one from which some advocates of restorative justice recoil.
The idea of reparation or restitution has a long history. As long a history in English law as the idea that justice is served by imposing a punishment on offenders. A quick look back to England’s first legal code, that of King Æthelberht of Kent, issued in the early 7th century, is a case in point. If you were found guilty of putting someone’s eye out, you were required to pay 50 shillings by way of compensation. A punch on the nose would cost you 3 shillings, as would a broken rib. And so on, even to consideration of the level of compensation for causing harm to the ‘organ of generation’.
And finally, restorative justice can be understood as transformative. On one level, of both offender and of victim, the former through providing effective rehabilitation, the latter through healing to the greatest extent possible the harm suffered. Zehr certainly thought transformation part of what I would call the entire apparatus of the exercise- ‘…restorative justice must often be ‘transformative justice’ …justice must go beyond a return to the status quo’. I suggest close attention to how one interprets “transformation” in its context. In many instances there can be no return to the status quo – it is long gone for the victim.
Equally, at a more fundamental level, the potential to transform might be at least a contributor to how we view society and each other. Our response to crime would thus become a lens through which to view a change in the way we order society.
In essence then restorative justice is capable of broadly referring to a mechanism through which:
- first, victims are positioned at the centre of the criminal justice process rather than, as historically treated, ‘footnotes to crime’;
- second, the aim is that the offender make some form of reparation for the crime; and
- finally, that victim, offender and perhaps wider society are transformed as a consequence of a successful application of the process. In particular, it seeks to reintegrate the offender into wider society. As such it is primarily forward looking.
Having outlined its nature, I turn to attempts to implement restorative justice. Since the first or some of the first experiments with what was known as victim-offender conferencing in the early 1970s in Canada, there has been a marked growth in programmes worldwide. After substantial growth in the 1990s, by 2011 there were an estimated 1,500 such programmes worldwide, 300 in the United States alone. In England and Wales there have been a number of such experimental studies since the early 1980s. And since the turn of the century– that’s the twenty-first century – there have been three main restorative justice schemes, each supported by the Home Office.
I want to reflect on what, albeit anecdotally, the legal community thinks has been learned if we glance back. Far from unique to restorative justice, reception of a scheme best described as untried, unfamiliar, unwieldy, uncomfortable, and several more “uns”, change is disproportionately locked to the mechanics of implementation. It is also vulnerable to the quality of supporting information and to canny presentation of that information.
Most legal professionals working in criminal justice would recognise these reactions:
Why is he (it’s generally he, interestingly) being allowed to get away with it? Why are we sending people to prison for things that don’t matter and letting thugs get off scot free?
You’ll be having murderers chatting to the dead person’s family next. I’m not having them painting my house, they’ll be casing it for the next burglary. Why is taxpayers’ money wasted on this?
How come the poor victim’s forced to meet this thug/burglar/fraudster/drug dealer?
It’s the limp wristed softies’ latest trendy idea. They’re all named Torquil.
And, for the avoidance of doubt and just to clarify “It’s a disgrace”.
History is paved with good intentions which came to nought, or to little, in the face of misunderstanding. All the above criticisms include a damaging underlying assumption: For example getting away with it, people are imprisoned for things that don’t matter, the victim is obliged to endure contact.
In terms of conveying a message, we are where we are, and it would be foolish to overlook the effect on the reader listener or viewer of how that message is presented. Or should the phrase now be “We aren’t where we were”? We live in the age of social media. We have seen the dawn of the viral. We gasp at the power of the upload.
I make no comment on the merits of the following sentence, I merely, as modern mores might term it, put it out there: would a widespread reaction to restorative justice have been, in those earlier days, what proponents would see as more astute to its reality if encounters had been publicised first, and principle, philosophy and implementation mechanism second?
The sadness running through many criminal trials is the legacy of altered lives. Not just the devastation when someone will never come back, that no goodbye was said, that a child will not know a parent, that a parent has buried a child. It is also the abiding nervousness and anxiety of the householder no longer confident in good locks and sensible precaution. The loss of confidence which leads to poor job prospects. And so on, and so on.
These are not after effects forged in a crucible of philosophy and intellectual analysis. They are quotidian miseries and they pervade lives.
The power of restorative justice arguably includes its capacity to address the dark hours, when sudden memory constrains how a victim lives his or her life. Let me give you two examples, both residential burglaries, taken from cases in which I sentenced and in which a face to face contact had been mediated.
First, a lady of some age who had been burgled and lost items for which the phrase “of sentimental value” was wholly inadequate, met the early twenties man who had broken into her home. He had ransacked it, taken those precious things she could never replace, and some goods she could replace if she chose. Video player, computer, and so on.
She said after her restorative justice session that the monster – her word – she had visualised turned out to be a miserable youth with no family structure, no aim in life, and no education. He could not, she said, lift his head to meet her eyes for the first third of the meeting. Once she understood that he had not targeted her, but rather had lighted upon her home and her goods, she could begin to assess him. Her conclusion was that without intervention he would rattle from one chaotic life event to another, since he lacked the wherewithal to understand or to improve himself. And here is the summary which made an impression on me:
“I’d seen what a snivelling pathetic little pretend-man he is and I felt sorry for him. Suddenly, the power shifted, to me.”
Second, a man in his late twenties met the elderly widower whose home he had entered so as to take and then sell property to fund a drug habit. His comment was that he had never thought of a person at all. He saw only the bricks and mortar as he passed, and the opportunistic crime was committed at speed. The victim reminded him of his grandfather. Until the meeting he had, he said, been able to hide behind damage to fabric and loss of tangible things. At and after it, he was fixed with the memory of tears running down the face of a man whose grandson he might have been.
With all that in mind I want to move to a wider question. Can or should the development of restorative justice amount to a paradigm shift in our approach to criminal justice; one which places a restorative rather than punitive approach at its heart?
The first question is does it or could it amount to a paradigm shift. There are two answers, the first relatively straightforward. Punishment is one of the aims which underpin sentencing. As the Ministry of Justice put it in 2008, ‘We have a duty to punish and reform offenders. A just and civilised society is one where offenders are both punished for breaking the law and given the opportunity to reform and turn away from crime.’ And as the Lord Chancellor went on to explain at the same time,
‘”We should not shy away from the fact that the sentences of the court are first and foremost for the punishment of those who have broken the law”’
Given this it seems relatively clear that Zehr’s view that the basis of society’s response to offender should be restorative and not punitive or, as he puts it, based on retribution, would amount to a fundamental shift.
The second answer is a more nuanced. Moving from one paradigm to another involves a period, often a long period, where the established approach finds it increasingly difficult to operate effectively. There might be potential competitors jostling for position, each suggesting better scientific models than the last one. Or there may be a number of variants of the alternative approaches.
We can certainly see through the three different conceptions of restorative justice that there possible alternative systems which could replace our current approach. The point we can take from this is that while restorative justice might not be the successor to the present approach, its growth might suggest we are in what Kuhn referred to as the phase of extraordinary science – an established paradigm is breaking down and work is being done to devise its successor. At the very least then, Zehr’s work and that of others in the field should give us pause for thought. It should make us focus on the possibility of fundamental reform, even if we ultimately reject restorative justice as a component part, or if we reject any change.
This raises the second issue. Is restorative justice likely to be the answer? The House of Commons Justice Select Committee was cautious. Reviewing work done to evaluate a number of restorative justice schemes, including that by Professor Shapland and others in 2008 for the Ministry of Justice , it concluded that evidence in support of the cost-effectiveness of restorative justice schemes was ‘thin’. While it offered the potential for ‘clear and measurable benefits to the criminal justice system and wider society’ more work was needed.
Here however we need to give ourselves a warning and look back to Thomas Kuhn. The general approach to restorative justice has been to introduce it or pilot it against the background of the established approach. It has been trialled in the context of a system of criminal justice in which punishment is a, if not the, primary aim. In England and Wales, under the Victims Code, restorative justice is an additional mechanism working within the established sentencing regime. Kuhn might well have drawn our attention to how Copernicus’ theory of astronomy replaced Ptolemy’s. It did not form part of Ptolemy’s theory. Nor was it part of a pilot study against the background of, and implicitly accepting the assumptions underpinning, Ptolemy’s theory. The two theories had different basic and fundamental assumptions. Their respective success depended on explanatory elegance and ability.
If we are properly and fruitfully to consider restorative justice’s merits we might need to adopt an approach which does not rest indirectly or implicitly on the present approach to sentencing. We might need to assess it through discrete, standalone pilots, testing its efficacy in isolation from the present approach. We arguably need to test it as a genuine alternative rather than as something to be integrated into our present approach. We might need to devise a study which diverts a discrete category of offending away from the established criminal justice system entirely and then a long-term study, to found a confident testable conclusion as to efficacy, in the broadest definition of that noun.
And this leads me to my final point. What do we want it to achieve? Is it just or primarily about increasing victim satisfaction, as was suggested by Michael Spurr, then head of the National Offender Management Service, in his evidence to the Justice Committee. Is it aimed at agreeing a form of reparative activity by the offender? Or is it meant to be truly transformative for victim, offender and society? And if so, how and in what ways do we measure such transformations. Whichever approach we were to take we would have to be clear about the goal. To reach that point though would we need to transform how we view crime and our response to it?
Where does this leave us? I think the answer should be a question and a thought. The question is one this University taught me to ask and which I repeated when installed as its Chancellor and at degree congregations since. ‘Why are we doing this?’ In other words, why do we have the approach to criminal justice we’ve adopted? The point Zehr was making, and which those who promoted probation in the 19th century and who promoted the change to case management in civil proceedings for over 100 years, was in one sense simple. It was to question our fundamental assumptions, on which our approach to sentencing and to the civil process was based. Zehr asked the “Why?” question. Not why doesn’t this part of the system work, but why do we have this system at all? Why do we think it the best or most appropriate? And perhaps the development of the confusion of different approaches and conceptions of restorative justice is one symptom of that questioning of fundamentals. And perhaps again it might require us to consider and analyse whether we are living through an extended period moving from one criminal justice paradigm to another, where Ptolemy might be giving way to Copernicus. I know – and Edward Bramley would support me – that the University of Sheffield can lead the answer.
That was the question. What about the thought. It comes from the American psychologist, Philip Zimbardo. You might not know the name but you certainly know of his most famous contribution, the Stanford Prison Experiment of 1971. A group of university students took on the part of prison guards and prisoners in a mock prison. Their roles were assigned randomly. The aim was to see what effect perceived power would have on the behaviour of participants.
The experiment had to be abandoned after six days. Why? Because a number of the mock guards became increasingly authoritarian, and in some instances abused and psychologically tortured the mock prisoners. Their behaviour was a consequence of the situation. In Zimbardo’s words, “‘Bad systems’ create ‘bad situations’ create ‘bad apples’ create bad behaviour,’ even in good people”. And as he argues, the converse can equally be true.
In terms of criminal justice, the paradigm shift Zehr and others wanted was for restorative justice to be the good system. In that there is nothing new; at their heart all criminal justice systems aim to be the good system. The question is: have we devised that system or are we still waiting to make the shift to one, and, if we are, is restorative justice the answer? We have a duty to ask the right questions and try to arrive at the right answers. In that there is nothing new under the sun.
I wonder if all I’ve tried to say about restorative justice is more elegantly caught by two comments on twenty-first century life: First: the ideal state is one in which an injury done to the least of its citizens is done to us all. Second: we achieve justice when those not injured by injustice are as outraged as those who are. Apt, economic, and perfectly judged, I think you’ll agree. They are the words of the magistrate I most admire. Solon of Athens. Born, 638 BC. As the title of this lecture invites you to ponder, is anything new under the sun?
 I thank my colleague John Sorabji his help and guidance in preparing this lecture.
 As noted in D. O’Keefe (ed) Judicial Review in European Union Law: Essays in Honour of Lord Slynn, (Kluwer) (2000)
 Justice Secretary launches new prison and probation service to reform offenders – Press Release (8 February 2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/justice-secretary-launches-new-prison-and-probation-service-to-reform-offenders; Probation reform: open letter from the Secretary of State for Justice (19 July 2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/probation-reform-open-letter-from-the-secretary-of-state-for-justice.
 For an outline of the history see, R. Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England, (CUP, 1964, 4 edn) at 196ff. As he notes ‘The Criminal Justice Act of 1925 made the appointment of probation officers compulsory in all Magistrates’ Courts. Many courts did not understand the value of good probation work, and they merely made appointments because they had to…’
 See National Offender Management Service Annual Report and Accounts (2016) – (2017) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630533/6.3329_NOMS_AR_180717_19_July_web.pdf
 A. Clarke, The Woolf Reforms: A singular event or an ongoing process, in D. Dwyer (ed) The Civil Procedure Rules 10 Yeas On, (OUP, 2009) at 44.
 A. Diamond, The Summons for Directions, (1959) 75 Law Quarterly Review 43 at 44.
 CPR r.3.
 Judicature Acts 1873-1875.
 Courts Act 1971.
 J. Langbein, The Origins of the Adversarial Criminal Trial, (OUP, 2003).
 A. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Inheritance, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1181 2004.
 (University of Chicago Press, 1962).
 In other words, the shift from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican view of cosmology.
 Lord Falconer LC, Foreword to the 2 edition of the Civil Procedure Rules, (HMSO, 2005) at vi.
 D. Roche, The evolving definition of restorative justice, Contemporary Justice Review 4 (2001) 341 at 342.
 J. Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and a better future, reprinted in G. Johnstone (ed), A Restorative Justice Reader, (Routledge, 2013) at 59.
 Marshall cited in J. Shapland et al, Restorative Justice in Practice, (Routledge, 2011) at 5.
 A. Eglash, Beyond Restitution – Creative Restitution, in B. Galway & J. Hudson (eds), Restitution in Criminal Justice, (Lexington, 1977) cited as the original of the term restorative justice by H. Zehr, Changing Lenses – Restorative Justice for Our Times, (Herald Press, 1990, 2015 re-issue) at 14, fn. 1.
 A summary of the ways in which it can be carried out in England and Wales is given in House of Commons Justice Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2016-2017, Restorative Justice (HC 164) at 5.
 See The Code of Practice for Victims (October 2015) at para. 1.12
 Ibid at 34 and 54; and see Ministry of Justice, Restorative Justice Action Plan for the Criminal Justice System for the Period to March 2018 (February 2017).
 Ministry of Justice, Restorative Justice Action Plan 2014, (November 2014) at 3
 The Code of Practice for Victims (October 2015) at 34.
 See G. Johnstone & D van Ness, The meaning of restorative justice, in G. Johnstone & D van Ness, Handbook of Restorative Justice (Routledge, 2011) at 9-16 for an outline of the three broad conceptions of restorative justice: encounter-based; reparative-based; transformative-based.
 The Code of Practice for Victims (October 2015) at 34, ‘Restorative Justice can provide a means of closure and enable you to move on, . . .’
 See, for instance, H. Zehr (Herald Press, 1990, 2015 re-issue) at 191at 37, fn. 6 ‘In earlier editions of this book, I used the word closure . . . This is not a victim-friendly word, and I would never use it today. As Emma Jo Snyder, whose son was murdered, told me, ‘That one will give you a black eye.’’
 The Laws of Æthelberht https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/560-975dooms.asp.
 Ibid. clause 43, ‘If an eye be (struck) out, let bot be made with fifty shillings.’
 Ibid, clause 57, ‘If any one strike another with his fist on the nose, three shillings.’; clause 66, ‘If a rib be broken, let bot be made with three shillings.’
 Ibid. clause 64, ‘If any one destroy (another’s) organ of generation, let him pay with three leud-gelds; if he pierce it through, let him make bot with six shillings; if it be pierced within, let him make bot with six shillings.’
 See, for instance, H. Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice, reprinted in The Big Book of Restorative Justice (Good Books, 2015) at 33ff;
 H. Zehr, (1990, 2015 re-issue) at 191-192.
 G. Johnstone & D van Ness, ibid at 15; and see H. Zehr, (1990, 2015 re-issue) at 129ff, 191ff.
 H. Zehr, (1990, 2015 re-issue) at 37.
 A point emphasised by T. Marshall, for instance, in his initial work for the Home Office, see T. Marshall, Restorative Justice – An Overview (Home Office, 2001) at 4ff http://covrj.uk/restorative-justice-an-overview/
 For an account of such see, H. Zehr, (1990, 2015 re-issue) at 160ff; and see, J. Shapland, G. Robinson & A. Sorsby, Restorative Justice in Practice, (Routledge, 2011) at 4-7.
 R. London, A new paradigm arises, reprinted in G. Johnstone (ed) (2013) at 7.
 For an account of these see, J. Shapland, G. Robinson & A. Sorsby, ibid. at 7-10.
 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.142(1)(a).
 Ministry of Justice, Punishment and Reform – Our approach to managing offenders, (December 2008) at 2 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100512140141/http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/punishment-reform.pdf
 As cited in House of Commons Justice Committee, Sentencing guidelines and Parliament: building a bridge,  https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmjust/715/71507.htm#n71
 J. Shapland et al, Does Restorative Justice affect reconviction, (Ministry of Justice Research Series, 10/08) (July 2008) https://restorativejustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/resources/files/Does%20restorative%20justice%20affect%20reconviction.pdf .
 House of Commons Justice Committee, ibid (HC 164) at 10. For a wider viewpoint see J. Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Response Regulation?, (OUP, 2002)
 House of Commons Justice Committee, ibid (HC 164) at 11
 P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, (Routledge, 2007).
 Ibid at 445.
 Ibid at 446ff